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Preserving Diplomacy over History? Historic Preservation of Chanceries
in the District of Columbia Under the Foreign Missions Act

I. Introduction: An Unfair Balance for Historic Preservation

Section 206 of the Foreign Missions Act (FMA), enacted by Congress in 1982, provides
foreign missions seeking to locate or already located in historic districts in the District of
Columbia (DC) an expedited process of no more than six months for obtaining permits to locate,
alter, expand or replace their chanceries.1 In the most significant test of DC historic preservation
law under the FMA, the Republic of Turkey endured an nine-year legal battle, beginning in
1986, to win approval to demolish and replace its chancery at 2523 Massachusetts Avenue, a site
located in two overlapping historic districts. 2 Turkey’s right to demolish the chancery, which
was challenged by a coalition of citizens’ associations, was definitively affirmed in 1995 by the
federal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Sheridan Kalorama Historical
Association v. Christopher (hereinafter Turkish Chancery III). 3
Judge Ginsburg’s opinion purported to settle the major procedural and jurisdictional
questions of section 206 of the FMA. It did so through radical simplification. The court held that
the FMA lodges exclusive original jurisdiction for approving demolition, alteration or expansion
permits for chanceries in the specially-constituted Foreign Missions Board of Zoning Adjustment
(FM-BZA) rather than the regular DC agencies empowered under DC law to approve such

1

22 U.S.C. § 4306 (2005); D.C. Code § 6-1306 (2004). The statute does not specify historic districts per se;
rather it provides that chanceries seeking to locate or located in areas “zoned medium-high or high density
residential” and “any other area ... zoned mixed-use diplomatic or special purpose” are subject to the oversight of
the FM-BZA. 22 U.S.C. § 4306(b)(2). Virtually all the historic districts in D.C. in which chanceries are located or
would seek to locate – i.e., Massachusetts Avenue, Sheridan-Kalorama, Dupont Circle – fall into these zoning
categories. See “Appendix” for reference to this statute throughout.
2
The two historic districts are the Massachusetts Avenue Historic District and the Sheridan-Kalorama Historic
District. The new chancery has the address of 2525 Massachusetts Avenue.
3
49 F.3d 750 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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permits for historic properties, 4 namely the Historic Preservation Review Board (HPRB) and the
Mayor’s Agent for Historic Preservation (MAHP). 5 The FM-BZA’s exclusive grant of authority
is from the FMA; it exists solely to rule on applications for chancery locations and uses, and it is
composed of four DC and two federal appointees. The DC circuit court further found that the
FM-BZA was free to disregard the opinion of the HPRB, which had recommended against
demolishing the chancery, and free to avoid consulting the MAHP, who had delayed issuing an
opinion. 6 The FMA’s mandate that “substantial compliance with District of Columbia ...
regulations governing historic preservation shall be required” 7 was thus seriously weakened to
requiring only pro forma procedural courtesies.
The legal challenge to the FM-BZA’s decision to grant Turkey its new chancery not only
failed to save the historic structure but radically streamlined what the FMA requires. Not
surprisingly, since this decision the courts have been clear of disputes involving section 206; all
subsequent chancery proposals have been decided within six months. No doubt the primary
reason that no chancery permit application has been litigated beyond the FM-BZA is that no
foreign mission has been so bold as Turkey as to propose demolishing a historic building. Yet it
remains to be seen how the FM-BZA would rule if confronted with such a proposal today – a
prospect that is certainly not inconceivable. What seems beyond dispute, however, is that the
FM-BZA has the authority to rule as it sees fit on the status of some of DC’s most cherished
historic properties.
The logic of providing foreign missions expeditious process was driven by another of the
FMA’s major purposes: to require that the international interests and obligations of the United
4

Id. at 758.
See D.C. Law § 2-144 (2004).
6
49 F.3d at 759. See generally Tom Precious, Plan for Turkish Chancery Angers Neighbors, Wash. Post, Dec. 12,
1987, at E3.
7
22 U.S.C. § 4306(d)(2) (2005).
5
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States be a significant factor in the FM-BZA’s review of permit applications. 8 If the effort to
save the Turkish Chancery lost both the battle and the war for the due consideration of historic
preservation, the underlying case also exemplified – by way of a real war – how significant a
factor foreign policy can be under the FMA. In “timing that could not be more auspicious” 9 for
the privileging of international concerns, Turkey, then as now a key U.S. ally, received approval
for demolition from the FM-BZA on the night the Persian Gulf War began, January 16, 1991, at
a hearing in which four senior State Department officials testified on Turkey’s behalf. 10 The FMBZA’s approval demonstrated the extent to which the FMA could be stretched in extraordinary
circumstances to permit international concerns to outweigh any and all municipal objections. The
DC circuit court’s subsequent affirmance of the least restrictive definition of “substantial
compliance” ensured that historic preservation would have even less legal weight in ordinary
circumstances than the FMA intended. If the balance between historic preservation and
preserving diplomacy was never truly a fair one to begin with, now the historic preservation
scale was rendered permanently insubstantial.
This paper explores the precarious preservation status of historic chanceries in the
District of Columbia from a policy, legal and practical standpoint. This paper first reviews the
8

See 22 U.S.C. § 4306(d).
Thomas Bell, U.S. Does Favor for Key Ally; Turkey Gets Help Here on Zoning Variance, Wash. Post, Jan. 24,
1991, at J1.
10
See id.; FM-BZA decision issued March 15, 1991. Ironically enough, the first beneficiary of the DC circuit court’s
decision in March of 1995 was the Embassy of Greece, which filed in July 1995 to build a new chancery annex at
2221 Massachusetts Avenue, receiving the unqualified approval of the FM-BZA on October 20, 1995. Even if
international politics did not play a role in this particular decision (because the proposed construction was not
offensive to historic preservation, as demonstrated by the HPRB’s earlier approval), how could the FM-BZA deny
Greece (if it had proposed, say, demolishing and replacing the structure) on historic preservation grounds when
Turkey was just definitively allowed to demolish and replace its embassy, for fear of creating an international
incident. On the one hand, the FM-BZA could well create an international incident if it gave historic preservation
too much weight; on the other hand, the FM-BZA may easily dispense with historic preservation in light of such
international concerns. Either way, the problem lies in the FM-BZA having sole authority to judge and weigh both
these issues simultaneously (or more correctly, deferring completely to the State Department when it comes to
international issues, but not deferring at all to the HPRB when it comes to historic preservation issues). So Turkey
and Greece both got their new chanceries. If only their longstanding disputes could be settled so favorably. See FMBZA decision issued October 20, 1995.
9
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trends and policy interests that are certain to affect historic chanceries in the coming years. This
paper next examines the balanced statutory language of section 206 of the FMA in light of its
multiple policy goals. This paper also reviews how the FM-BZA has exercised its exclusive
authority in several chancery cases and given some consideration to historic preservation in
innovative, if not completely legally sound, ways. The reasoning and conclusions of Turkey
Chancery III will then be examined, and the meaning of “substantial compliance” explored, both
in terms of its true legal significance – a high standard of compliance – and proper content – the
DC Historic Landmark and Historic Preservation Act of 1978 (hereinafter “the DC Act”). 11

II. Historic Chanceries in the District of Columbia: Future Needs

The central document in the ongoing policy discussion of chancery issues is the Foreign
Missions and International Organizations Element (hereinafter FM Element) of the
Comprehensive Plan for the National Capital, which was adopted by the National Capital
Planning Commission (NCPC) on August 4, 2004. 12 The Comprehensive Plan provides a
“statement of principles, goals and planning policies ... for the next 20 years”; 13 and the FM
Element details the NCPC’s vision of the principles, goals and policies affecting foreign missions
in DC from the standpoint of the federal interest in “[p]lan[ning] a secure and welcoming
environment for the location of diplomatic and international activities ... in a manner that is
appropriate to the status and dignity of these activities.” 14
Like the procedures mandated by the FMA, the preparation and implementation of the
Comprehensive Plan entail a complex mixture of federal and DC responsibilities. As set out in
11

D.C. Law § 2-144 (2004).
FM Element, available at <http://www.ncpc.gov/planning_init/CompPlanOnline/ForeignMissions.html>.
13
Introduction, Comprehensive Plan for the National Capital: Federal Elements, available at
<http://www.ncpc.gov/planning_init/CompPlanOnline/Introduction.html#_ftn1>.
14
See FM Element, note 12, supra.
12
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the 1973 District of Columbia Home Rule Act, 15 the NCPC only prepares the federal elements;
the Mayor prepares the DC elements, which then must be adopted by the DC City Council. 16
Unlike the former process, the latter explicitly includes diverse stakeholders. 17 The
Comprehensive Plan has guiding rather than binding legal weight for DC administrative agencies
and courts. 18 It foremost affects matters of zoning: the DC Zoning Commission is “charged with
preparing, adopting and subsequently amending the Zoning Regulations and Map, not to be
inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan”; 19 and, per the FMA, the NCPC reviews proposed
amendments to the Zoning Map affecting federal interests to determine whether they are in
compliance with the Comprehensive Plan. 20 The NCPC is even more directly involved in the DC
government’s oversight of specific projects requiring zoning adjustment review. The NCPC
appoints the fifth member to the Board of Zoning Adjustment (BZA), and per the FMA, the
NCPC Executive Director holds the sixth seat on the FM-BZA. Thus, with the NCPC accounting
for one third of the votes on the board that oversees chancery issues, the predictions and
proposals outlined by the NCPC in the FM Element deserve close scrutiny.
According to the FM Element, 169 foreign missions are located in DC, of which 152 own
the buildings that house their chanceries. 21 All chanceries in DC are in the Northwest quadrant of
the city, predominantly in the Sheridan-Kalorama and Dupont Circle neighborhoods. Eighteen
chanceries are located in the International Chancery Center in Upper Northwest, a large parcel of
land owned by the federal government and leased to foreign missions at a low cost and without

15

D.C. Law § 1-203 (2004).
See Introduction, note 13, supra. For the status of the District of Columbia Elements, see
<http://www.inclusivecity.org>.
17
See <http://www.inclusivecity.org>.
18
See Gondelman v. D.C. Dep’t of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 789 A.2d 1238, 1246 (D.C. 2002) (“District
agencies may look to the . . . elements of the Comprehensive Plan for general policy guidance”) (citations omitted).
19
available at <http://dcoz.dc.gov/services/zoning/commish.shtm>.
20
22 U.S.C. § 4306(e)(2).
21
The term chancery refers to the principal administrative office of the embassy.
16
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DC regulatory review. A great many chanceries in DC are designated as historic: chanceries that
are contributing buildings in historic districts; and chanceries that are themselves historic
landmarks. 22 The FM Element predicts that there will be large growth in the number of existing
chanceries relocating and new chanceries locating in DC. 23 The FM Element advances three
policy recommendations to meet these chancery needs:
• Identify additional areas where foreign missions may locate without review by the
Foreign Missions Board of Zoning Adjustment.
• Develop a new methodology to determine appropriate additional chancery development
areas.
• Revise the mapped diplomatic areas, reflecting additional areas where foreign missions
may locate. 24
To act on these recommendations, DC will both have to modify the Zoning Map and find
new areas within matter-of-right zones where chanceries can be tempted to locate. The FMA
allows chanceries to locate as a matter-of-right in areas zoned “commercial, industrial,
waterfront, or mixed-use.” Chanceries are also permitted to locate, subject to FM-BZA
disapproval, “in any area which is zoned medium-high or high density residential; and ... in any
other area, determined on the basis of existing uses, which includes office or institutional uses,
including, but not limited to, any area zoned mixed-use diplomatic or special purpose.” 25 DC
implemented the latter directive by creating the Diplomatic Overlay District (D) in areas then

22

The Sheridan-Kalorama and Massachusetts Avenue Historic Districts are populated with scores of chanceries that
have been deemed contributing buildings. As of January 2003, at least ten chanceries were listed on the District of
Columbia Inventory of Historic Sites as historic landmarks: those of Egypt, Iraq, Cameroon, Indonesia, Peru,
Russia, Great Britain, Japan, and Brazil.
23
[L]ocations for as many as 100 new and relocated chanceries may have to be found in the next 25 years. This
could require the identification of four to five chancery sites per year. Forty-eight foreign missions relocated within
the nation’s capital in the last 20 years, and if this trend continues, some 60 foreign missions will relocate by 2030.
In addition, approximately 40 new foreign missions could locate new chanceries in the District. Not all of these
foreign missions will require new sites – some will buy or lease existing foreign mission facilities, while others may
buy or lease other existing buildings. However, the recent trend has been toward new construction of larger facilities
on large lots, both on privately owned land and in the International Chancery Center. As a result, there may be a
requirement to identify a significant number of buildings and sites for these future chanceries.” FM Element, note 16
supra (emphasis added).
24
See id.
25
22 U.S.C. § 4306(b).
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thought to be most amenable for chanceries, primarily in the Sheridan-Kalorama and Sixteenth
Street neighborhoods. 26 As the demand for housing has grown tremendously since 1983, some of
these areas have become increasingly residential and (from the residents’ standpoint) crowded
with chanceries. Now, a zoning petition before the DC Zoning Commission seeks to remove the
D District from half of the Sheridan-Kalorama neighborhood, which would make it harder for
chanceries to locate there. 27 Together with the standard complaints about increased traffic and
parking congestion, chanceries have long been the target of criticism that they reduce an already
scarce housing market. 28
If left unaddressed, the trends detailed in the FM Element and other trends have negative
implications for historic preservation. If existing chanceries requiring more space are not
encouraged to relocate to larger facilities, they may opt to take the approach of Greece and seek
to expand – or that of Turkey, and seek to replace – their existing buildings. Compounding this
threat to historic preservation is an important factor not mentioned in the FM Element: the
heightened security environment since September 11 may lead chanceries to build new unsightly
garages, barriers, and checkpoints on their properties that could disrupt the character of historic
26

“A chancery shall be permitted use in a D Overlay District, subject to disapproval by the Board of Zoning
Adjustment, based on the criteria in this section.” 11 D.C.M.R. 1001.1.
27
“To locate, replace, or expand a chancery in the R-5-D, R-5-E, or SP District or in the D Overlay District, or to
reconstruct an existing chancery that is destroyed in an R-1, R-2, R-3, R-4, R-5-A, R-5-B, or R-5-C District,
application shall be made to the Board of Zoning Adjustment.” Id. 1002.1. Thus, any squares in a zone such as the
area Sheridan Circle, which is currently zoned as “D/R-3,” if the Diplomatic Overlay District is removed, would no
longer allow chanceries. See Laila Al-Arian, Neighbors Seeks Relief from Chancery Deluge, III Dupont Current No.
43, March 30, 2005, at 1.
28
See FM Element, note 16, supra; District of Columbia Comprehensive Plan Amendments of 1989, D.C. Law 8129 (discouraging chanceries in residential areas); cf. Kalorama Heights Ltd. Partnership v. District of Columbia
Dep't of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 655 A.2d 865 (D.C., 1995) (affirming the MAHP’s denial of a special
merit demolition permit for a historic building, a.k.a. “Moses House,” that formerly housed the French chancery, in
order to build condominiums on the site). In the underlying MAHP decision appealed in Kalorama Heights Ltd.
Partnership, “the Mayor's Agent ... noted that the community had made clear it would prefer a chancery to a
condominium project.” Id. at 870, note 6. The frustrated remarks of petitioner’s counsel in the MAHP decision are
fairly representative of the anti-chancery and pro-housing perspective: “You're rejecting the idea of additional tax
revenue for the city? You're rejecting the idea of preserving the Comprehensive Plan of staying away from
embassies and putting housing stock in the District of Columbia as no special merit?” Id. at 874, note 12. The
building has since been designated a historic landmark.
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districts or landmarks. 29 Finally, there is always the possibility in a changing world that historic
chanceries may simply be abandoned, as was the case with the Macedonian chancery, or
diplomatic relations cut off and assets frozen, as was the case with the Iraqi chancery, a historic
landmark. 30
Addressing chanceries’ growth and size demands in the ways recommended in the FM
Element also has significant implications for historic preservation. Consider the NCPC’s specific
recommendation to encourage foreign mission to “[l]ocate chanceries within the diplomatic
districts of the 16th Street corridor and the adjacent Columbia Heights, Adams Morgan, and Mt.
Pleasant neighborhoods,” areas which are touted as offering “potential redevelopment and
[adaptive] reuse opportunities.” 31 Several of these areas include current and possibly expanded
historic districts. It is certainly plausible that chanceries relocating in these areas could have a net
positive effect on historic preservation. In the most favorable scenario, foreign missions currently
occupying highly desirable (but too small) historic buildings would sell those properties to
private buyers, thus returning the oversight of these properties to the HPRB and MAHP. These
same foreign missions would either purchase (adequately sized) properties that are not in historic
districts, or historic properties that they would agree to use or renovate consistent with historic
preservation regulations (as enforced by an FM-BZA committed to historic preservation). 32
Perhaps some of these properties would even be in danger of demolition if not for the foreign
missions’ rehabilitation of them. 33

29

See Embassy of People’s Republic of Benin v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning, 534 A.2d 310, 319 (1987)
(comments of Ronald Mlotek).
30
In that case the State Department holds the asset in trust for the foreign government and is responsible for its
maintenance.
31
It seems far more likely that foreign missions will locate in these rapidly redeveloping areas rather than the other
areas touted by the FM Element: the South Capitol corridor and the Anacostia Waterfront. See FM Element, note 16
supra.
32
For examples of this, see the textual discussion of the FM-BZA’s approvals of Benin and Latvia, infra.
33
The FM Element refers approvingly to two such properties. See FM Element, note 16 supra.
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The less favorable outcome of the NCPC’s recommendations, however, is simply that
more foreign missions will own more historic properties, thereby reducing the gross number of
properties within the HPRB and MAHP’s ambit. And though the FM Element does not address
this scenario, it seems likely from the combined effect of high demand and sites ripe for adaptive
reuse that many of these new and relocated chanceries will seek to alter, expand or even replace
newly-acquired historic structures. 34 While the FM Element does list as an explicit policy goal
that foreign missions should be “encouraged” to respect historic preservation in how they use
their chanceries, no realistic guidance is offered as to how and when foreign missions should be
restricted from doing what they might view as necessary or economically beneficial. 35 In light of
the seemingly weightier and more imperative policy goal of providing a growing number of
chanceries adequate locations and facilities, as well as the temptation to view chanceries as an
engine of redevelopment, it is unlikely that the NCPC-influenced FM-BZA would be inclined to
enforce the same standard of historic preservation as would the HPRB or MAHP. 36

III. Purposes and Compromises of the FMA

The overarching purpose of Section 206 of the FMA (titled “Location in District”) was to
establish a federal mechanism by which the United States’ obligation under the Vienna

34

The Embassy for Sweden made one such proposal. See FM-BZA decision issued June 6, 1990.
The FM Element also envisions a well-known historic site, the Armed Forces Retirement Home (also known as
the “Soldiers’ Home”), as becoming a new foreign missions center. This large parcel of land is owned by the federal
government and thus would not even be subject to FM-BZA oversight. See FM Element, note 16, supra; see also
<http://www.afrh.gov/DWP/afrh/washington/afrhwashingtonhistory.htm>. While the FM Element states that “[a]n
additional adjacent 25 to 30 acres [of the Soldiers’ Home] are available for mixed-use development and would
exceed the requirements for a future foreign missions center,” it is not clear how the DC preservation community or
a zealously patriotic Congress will respond to plans to populate the Soldiers’ Home campus with chanceries of
foreign missions.
36
The Sweden case, in which the FM-BZA disapproved Sweden’s plans for expansion, may be a relic of the past in
this sense; note that it predates Turkish Chancery III.
35
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Convention on Diplomatic Relations 37 to facilitate foreign missions’ use of adequate facilities
would be effectively implemented in the District of Columbia. The underlying principle of the
Vienna Convention, which the FMA makes explicit, is reciprocity: the US assures that foreign
missions enjoy adequate facilities in the US so that US missions abroad receive the same
benefits. 38 Congress was concerned that DC administrative agencies could undermine the
reciprocity principle by discriminating against foreign missions as to where they could locate. 39
The FMA prevented this, first, by establishing that chanceries are permitted to locate as a matter
of right in commercial zones and to locate, subject to FM-BZA approval, in residential and
mixed-use zones. The FMA also forestalled potential discrimination or burdensome oversight by
DC agencies by requiring that “the limitations and conditions applicable to chanceries shall not
exceed those applicable to other offices or institutional uses.” 40
The FMA not only prevented DC from discriminating against chanceries but ensured that
federal determinations about foreign missions would be affirmatively privileged. It did so in two
overlapping ways: granting the Secretary of State prior veto power over “any proposed
37

The articles of the Vienna Convention relating to facilitating foreign missions’ acquisition of property state:
Article 21
1. The receiving State shall either facilitate the acquisition on its territory, in accordance with its laws, by
the sending State of premises necessary for its mission or assist the latter in obtaining accommodation in
some other way.
2. It shall also, where necessary, assist missions in obtaining suitable accommodation for their members.
Article 22
1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them,
except with the consent of the head of the mission.
2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the
mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or
impairment of its dignity.
3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of
the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution.
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, arts. XXI-XXII, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol.
500, p. 95.
38
22 U.S.C. § 4301(b).
39
“[T]he criteria under which decisions are made by local authorities as to particular locations, and municipal
regulations applicable thereto, do not properly weight the Federal interests involved or national security impacts that
result from their actions. What has resulted is a system whereby municipal authorities resolve such matters involving
Federal interests wholly on local and municipal grounds.” S. Rep. No. 97-283 at 14 (1981).
40
22 U.S.C. § 4306(b)(3).
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acquisition ... of any real property” 41 ; and requiring that international obligations and federal
concerns be significant factors in the FM-BZA approval process. Section 205 of the FMA
requires foreign missions to notify the Director of the newly-created Office of Foreign Missions
(OFM) of any proposed acquisition of a property and provides the Secretary of State sixty days
to approve or disapprove the proposal. The FMA instructs the Secretary of State to take into
account a given country’s treatment of the US mission in that country in determining the
privileges and benefits to be accorded that country’s mission in the US. 42 This determination is
made before a foreign mission’s application can be forwarded to the FM-BZA.
The heart of the FMA is the delineation of the FM-BZA’s authority and the criteria of
review it must use. These criteria reflect an attempted balance of both federal and municipal
interests involved in chancery issues, but they effectively assure the primacy of federal concerns.
Within six months of a foreign mission’s filing of an application “concerning the location,
replacement or alteration of a chancery,” the FM-BZA is required to make a determination
“concerning the location of a chancery ... or concerning an appeal of an administrative decision
with respect to a chancery based in whole or in part upon any zoning regulation or map.” 43 Two
of the six criteria that the FM-BZA must take into account involve foreign policy: “(1) [t]he
international obligation of the United States to facilitate the provision of adequate and secure
facilities for foreign mission in the Nation’s Capital”; and “(6) [t]he Federal interest, as
determined by the Secretary [of State].” The other four criteria are: (2) historic preservation, as
determined by the FM-BZA; (3) the adequacy of parking; (4) the extent to which the site
presents a security risk, as determined by the Secretary of State; (5) and the municipal interest, as

41

22 U.S.C. § 4305(a)(1). “‘Acquisition’ in this section includes ‘any acquisition or alteration or, or addition to, any
real property ... by a foreign mission.’” Id. at § 4305(b).
42
22 U.S.C. § 4301(c).
43
22 U.S.C. §§ 4306(c)(3), 4306(d).
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determined by the Mayor of DC. Thus, the FM-BZA, which is already weighted with two NCPC
appointees, is required to take into account and defer to the Secretary of State’s determinations
on three of six criteria.
Between sections 205 and 206 of the FMA, the Secretary of State has two functions to
perform that are really one and the same. Once the Secretary approves the chancery proposal
under her section 205 authority, it is a foregone conclusion that criteria (1), (4) and (6) of the
FM-BZA’s review will be satisfied. Congress’s aim was to leverage the reciprocity principle to
the US’s advantage by providing the Secretary a strong bargaining position with respect to
foreign missions whose countries may be discriminating against US missions or harming US
interests. 44 As a result, the State Department holds all of the cards as to whether the chancery
proposal is initially approved and at least half of the cards as to whether it is ultimately approved
by the FM-BZA, a fact reflected rhetorically in the OFM’s publications for foreign missions. 45 In
practice this means that once the State Department has made up its mind in the first instance, and
extracted whatever promises or compromises it has from the foreign mission, it effectively
becomes that foreign mission’s strongest advocate before the FM-BZA, unless the State
Department views is as useful to shift the blame for disapproval to the FM-BZA. In either case,
the FM-BZA is at the disposal of the State Department’s objectives.

44

“The purpose of S. 854 is to address a serious and growing imbalance between the treatment accorded in many
countries to official missions of the United States, and that made available to foreign government missions in the
United States. At present, the Department of State lacks authority compared to that enjoyed by many other
governments to enforce reciprocity in an appropriate manner.” S. Rep. No. 97-283 at 25 (1982).
45
See State Department Diplomatic Note 02-01 (June 1, 2002) (“Missions are encouraged to notify the
Department’s Office of Foreign Missions of proposed acquisitions as early in the process as possible. Missions
which obtain the benefit of the Department’s experience and advice in the early stages of an acquisition may avoid
unnecessary financial or legal complications.”) (emphasis added); State Department Guidance for Administrative
Officers § 7.4 (“The complexity of the zoning process with regard to the purchase or lease of chanceries or chancery
annexes requires missions to work closely with OFM before committing substantial time or financial resources to a
chancery project.”) (emphasis in original), both available at <http://www.state.gov/ofm/resource/pubs/>.
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The FMA’s overlay of foreign jurisdiction over chancery issues and insistent privileging
of federal concerns did not, however, altogether remove DC’s authority and interests. After all,
historic preservation is expressly included -- and the most lengthily expounded -- among the six
criteria that the FM-BZA must apply. 46 The FM-BZA is still a DC administrative agency and
composed of a majority of DC officials. And whatever its weight relative to the federal interest,
DC’s municipal interest in the proposal, as determined by the Mayor, must nonetheless be taken
into account. Finally, even though the FMA provided that FM-BZA proceedings are rule-making
rather than adjudicatory, 47 the FM-BZA approval process of chancery proposals has garnered
ample and timely participation from citizens groups, as the FMA itself encouraged. 48
The legislative history of the FMA makes clear that it could have been worse for DC and
historic preservation. The bill reported by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs transferred
all jurisdiction over chancery locations from DC agencies to the NCPC. 49 And a bill reported by
the Senate Committee on Government Affairs amended the House bill to include a sevenmember Foreign Missions Commission which would have been composed of four federal and
three DC appointees. 50 Significantly, while it far from clear throughout the bill’s progress
whether DC would even have any jurisdiction over chanceries, historic preservation concerns
were included from the beginning. Its fortunes, however, were linked to the jurisdictional
question: the bill first reported to the House only assured “the continuity of application of
46

“Historic preservation, as determined by the Board of Zoning Adjustment in carrying out this section; and in order
to ensure compatibility with historic landmarks and districts, substantial compliance with District of Columbia and
Federal regulations governing historic preservation shall be required with respect to new construction and to
demolition of or alteration to historic landmarks.” 22 U.S.C. § 4306(d)(2).
47
Id. § 4306(f).
48
See id. § 4306(c)(2) (“Regulations issued to carry out this section shall provide appropriate opportunities for
participation by the public in proceedings concerning the location, replacement, or expansion of chanceries.”). In
this way, the FMA embodied the community-conscious preservation laws and dynamics described by Carol Rose in
her seminal article on historic preservation that was exactly contemporary with the FMA. See Carol M. Rose,
Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of Historic Preservation, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 473 (1981).
49
See H. Rep. 97-102 at 33-34 (1981).
50
See S. Rep. No. 97-329, Minority Views of Messrs. Mathias, Eagleton, Rudman, Levin, and Sasser, at 40-42
(1982).
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historical [sic] preservation measures to facilities of foreign mission under regulations to be
issued by the NCPC”; 51 the Senate’s bill simply changed this to “regulations issued by the new
[Foreign Missions] Commission.” 52
What measures or regulations these would be, however, and how stringently they would
they be applied, were questions left unanswered until final passage of the bill. Responding to
pressure from DC Home Rule and historic preservation advocates alike, Congress substituted the
FM-BZA for the Foreign Missions Commission and enumerated its authority, however
ambiguously, to ensuring “substantial compliance” with the existing historic preservation
regime: “[I]n order to ensure compatibility with historic landmarks and districts, substantial
compliance with District of Columbia and Federal regulations governing historic preservation
shall be required with respect to new construction and to demolition of or alteration to historic
landmarks.” 53 If historic preservation was only one of six criteria on which the FM-BZA would
base its decisions, at least it appeared to be a substantive consideration controlled by laws that
the FM-BZA could not arbitrarily disregard.

IV. Ad Hoc Applications of the FMA: The FM-BZA and Historic Preservation

The FM-BZA and the State Department have done much in terms of regulatory
enactments and ad hoc policy decisions to take into account historic preservation concerns. To be
sure, regulations spelled out by the FM-BZA specify only the minimum procedural requirements
as to the application of DC’s historic preservation law: “When a chancery is located in an
historic landmark or historic district and the use requires review and processing of new

51

H. Rep. 97-102 at 35 (1981).
H. Conf. Rep. 97-693 at 40 (1982). For a more comprehensive but skewed account of the legislative history of the
FM-BZA, see Embassy of People’s Republic of Benin v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning, 534 A.2d 310 (1987).
53
22 U.S.C. § 4306(d)(2).
52
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construction, demolition, or alteration pursuant to [the DC Act] ... the application shall be
referred to the Historic Preservation Review Board ... for report and recommendation to the
Board of Zoning Adjustment.” 54 And the FM-BZA does not mince words as to the what
deference it owes the HPRB’s report and recommendation: “The Board of Zoning Adjustment
shall make the final determination as to substantial compliance with D.C. Law 2-144.”55 For its
part, the HPRB has not asserted any independent authority, as its most recent regulation
demonstrates: “The Board acts upon referrals from the Foreign Missions Board of Zoning
Adjustment relating to the new construction, demolition and alteration of foreign missions,
chanceries, and international organizations located in historic districts or historic landmarks,
pursuant to the [FMA].” 56 As will be examined more fully at the end of this paper, it is not the
HPRB’s but the FM-BZA’s regulatory prerogative – and ultimately that of the DC City Council
and Mayor – to grant the HPRB a more substantive role in chancery issues.
While the FM-BZA monopolized as much substantive authority as the FMA seemed to
allow, the FM-BZA also enacted regulations allowing for significant municipal participation in
the FM-BZA’s review process. Many of the same procedural requirements are applied to
chancery applications as to other Board of Zoning Adjustment hearings, 57 and two notable
regulations are also included: “The applicant shall submit sufficiently detailed plans to facilitate
review by the Board of any proposed new construction, demolition, or alteration.” 58 And: “Any
person may appear at a hearing in a chancery application proceeding and present evidence,
testimony, or argument that is relevant and not unduly repetitious.” 59 The regulations further

54

11 D.C.M.R. 1002.7
11 D.C.M.R. 1002.8
56
10A D.C.M.R. 106.4
57
11 D.C.M.R. 3134.6
58
11 D.C.M.R. 1002.9
59
11 D.C.M.R. 3134.12
55
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specify timely notice requirements, an opportunity for persons in opposition to the application to
be heard, and publication of a full and complete record of the hearing. 60
Owing in no small part to the participation of citizens groups, the FM-BZA’s rulings on
the few chancery proposals that have presented significant historic preservation challenges have
not been as unfavorable as the Turkish Chancery III precedent could have brought about – and
could still bring about. To the contrary, apart from the Turkish chancery case, the FM-BZA and
the State Department have been quite sensitive to DC municipal and historic preservation
objections. Several rulings have in fact developed an innovative case law (if it can be called
such) and a novel mediation process which incorporate historic preservation and other municipal
concerns into the FM-BZA’s review and ongoing enforcement.
This case law has not developed through denials but rather approvals of chancery
applications. The one notable example of a denial by the FM-BZA on historic preservation
grounds, predating Turkish Chancery III, involved Sweden’s proposal to purchase the BabcockMacomb House, a historic landmark, from the Republic of Cape Verde, and significantly expand
the site. At that time, FM-BZA was referring chancery location and alteration applications to the
MAHP for comment. Pursuant to the MAHP’s recommendation, the FM-BZA determined:
The height, bulk, and over-all scale of the proposed addition are starkly and
unequivocally incompatible with the scale of the Babcock-Macomb House. The essential
result of the proposal is that the addition would become the main structure on the lot,
both in fact and as viewed. The existing historic landmark would become a minor
element of a much larger mass. Its historic consequence would be lost. 61

60
61

11 D.C.M.R. 3134.9, 3134.13, 3134.16
FM-BZA decision issued June 6, 1990.
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Far from the rule, this is the one example of a disapproval by the FM-BZA on historic
preservation in the last fifteen years. 62 The FM-BZA’s disapproval of Sweden’s application, as
compared to Turkey’s, was no doubt made easier that Sweden is neither a key US ally nor a
country which the State Department would view as likely to recriminate against US interests. 63
In recent years, the FM-BZA has taken a more accommodating but no less serious
approach to historic preservation, as seen in its handling of two acquisition and alteration
proposals (of two more sensitive countries) to which citizens’ groups raised objections: those of
Benin and Latvia. In a 2000 decision concerning the proposed relocation of the Benin chancery
to 2124 Kalorama Road, a site within the Sheridan-Kalorama Historic District, the FM-BZA for
the first time imposed historic preservation conditions on a foreign mission’s use of a property:
A number of witnesses ... expressed the concern that a lack of property
maintenance at the subject premises could adversely affect the Sheridan-Kalorama
Historic District. The witnesses identified several chancery buildings, including Benin's
Cathedral Avenue chancery, that suffer from neglect and disrepair, as well as poorly
maintained and paved-over yards.
At the hearing, [Benin] Ambassador Lucien Tonoukouin stated his country's
commitment to maintaining the subject premises. He assured the Board that no work
would be done to alter the exterior of the building without first obtaining the necessary
historic preservation approvals. Before the hearing, [Benin] Ambassador Tonoukouin
met with the Sheridan-Kalorama Historical Association and developed a number of
conditions relating to use of the property, including retention of a resident caretaker to
maintain both the inside and outside of the premises on a daily basis, that will help
preserve the residential and historic character of the subject property. These conditions
have been incorporated into this Board's order. 64

62

Cape Verde has recently obtained approval of the HPRB and MAHP for the subdivision and sale of a small lot of
Babcock-Macomb House site in order to obtain funds for the house’s refurbishment. See MAHP decision issued
Feb. 5, 2004. Cape Verde apparently voluntarily (or perhaps at the urging of the State Department) submitted its
applications to the HPRB and MAHP in lieu of the FM-BZA, presumably because Cape Verde knew it would
prevail. Nonetheless, the Mayor’s Agent assertion of jurisdiction, while certainly admirable, is incorrect in light of
Turkish Chancery III: “Because the Babcock-Macomb House is a designated landmark listed in the Inventory, the
application for subdivision was referred to the HPRB for its review and recommendation to the Mayor’s Agent
pursuant to D.C. Official Code § 6-1106(b).” Id.
63
Predictably, Sweden has since opted to remain in a matter-of-right district at 15th and M Street, NW. Sweden is
scheduled to relocate to the Georgetown waterfront in 2006 in a newly-constructed property. See The Washington
Diplomat (April 23, 2003). The waterfront is also zoned as a matter-of-right zone.
64
FM-BZA decision issued Mach 31, 2000, reported at 47 D.C. REG. 2327, 2333 (emphasis added).
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Whether deliberately or not, the actual order did not in fact condition the FM-BZA’s
approval on Benin’s agreeing to obtain the HPRB’s approval for future alterations. 65
Nonetheless, the case demonstrated the FM-BZA’s willingness to take into account a foreign
mission’s past performance of its historic preservation duties and to require specific measures to
ensure its future stewardship. More significant still, the FM-BZA, together with the State
Department, also established and legally justified a novel mediation process for enforcement of
the conditions imposed in the FM-BZA’s order:
The State Department has taken the position that the Board can impose
conditions, whether agreed-upon or not, in its determinations under the Foreign Missions
Act. Under Section 206(g) of [the FMA] ... ‘The Secretary [of State] shall require foreign
missions to comply substantially with District of Columbia building and related codes in
a manner determined by the Secretary to be not inconsistent with the international
obligations of the United States.’ When the Board includes conditions in its order on a
chancery application, the State Department considers those conditions enforceable in the
same manner and to the same extent as the building and related codes of the District of
Columbia.
The State Department outlined the procedures that should be followed in the event
of a violation or other community concern. The complaining party should first contact the
pertinent embassy to discuss the matter. If that fails, the next step would be to request the
relevant District of Columbia agency to investigate the matter and certify to the State
Department that a violation has occurred. The State Department will then take up the
matter diplomatically with the foreign mission. In the case of exigent circumstances,
complaints should be referred directly to the State Department. 66
In a 2001 decision concerning Latvia’s proposed acquisition of a property at 2306
Massachusetts Avenue, the FM-BZA again referenced this ad hoc mediation process to enforce
the conditions it imposed on its approval. Yet this time, the FM-BZA also went so far as to
mandate (seemingly) direct HPRB involvement in any future alterations undertaken by Latvia:

65

“The Embassy of the Republic of Benin will retain and maintain the residential features and appearance of the
premises in a manner consistent with the residential character of the neighborhood. This includes exterior
landscaping and maintenance, interior lighting visible from Kalorama Road, N.W.; exterior lighting; use of draperies
and/or shades in the windows; maintenance of the driveway and walkway; and only one small plaque adjacent to the
front door to identify the premises as the Chancery of the Republic of Benin. No new fluorescent fixtures shall be
installed in the building, but any such existing fixtures in the kitchens, bathrooms, and basement may remain.” Id.
66
Id.
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At the hearing, Mr. Peteris Vinkelis, Deputy Chief of Mission of the Latvian
Embassy, stated his country's commitment to maintaining the historic qualities of the
subject property. He assured the Board that no work would be done to alter the
designated portions of the buildings without first obtaining the necessary historic
preservation approvals. Before the hearing, the Latvian Embassy developed and
submitted to the ANC a number of conditions relating to use of the property, including
respect for the historic preservation status of the building.... These conditions have been
incorporated into this Board's order.
The ANC [Advisory Neighborhood Council] expressed concern that the proposed
chancery use would affect the historic character of the building and the neighborhood, as
the neighborhood is a historic residential neighborhood. The ANC pointed out that the
HPRB only approved the proposed signage in concept, and that the HPRB mentioned its
limited ability to regulate interior alterations and the property of foreign governments.
The Board finds that any work on the historic portions of the property beyond the signage
will require the review of the HPRB, and that the proposed public access to the interior
will help to insure that no inappropriate alterations are undertaken. 67
As novel as this mediation process devised by the FM-BZA and the State Department
would seem to be, it is ambiguous in practice, very limited in its application in the best of
circumstances, probably unsustainable, and legally problematic. Even in the FM-BZA’s decision
concerning Latvia, which explicitly anticipated future review by the HPRB, the process by which
Latvia would obtain permission from the HPRB was (again) not specified or mandated in the
actual ordering language. 68 It might then appear to Benin and Latvia – and surely from the
perspective of their legal representatives – to be completely voluntary whether they should
submit an application to the HPRB in advance of any renovations they decide to undertake. If
they simply do not bother with obtaining HPRB approval, and a violation occurs, the damage has
already been done from the standpoint of historic preservation (unless, somehow, the State
Department manages to step in under “exigent circumstances”). Correcting the violation will
then depend wholly on the vigilance of concerned citizens, the willingness of DC agencies to
“investigate” the violation (presumably with the HPRB then taking the lead), and the willingness
of the State Department to twist arms diplomatically. Ultimately, the Benin and Latvia decisions
67
68

FM-BZA decision issued November 16, 2001, reported at 48 D.C. Reg. 10476, 10481-82.
See id. at 10489-90.
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do not grant more enforcement authority to DC but simply provide more leverage to the State
Department’s already strong bargaining position vis-à-vis chancery properties.
In their practical application, these precedents are also inadequate to address future needs.
The promises made by both Benin and Latvia would possibly be binding on them in the
contractual sense, but even so this only accounts for Benin and Latvia, not the scores of other
chanceries in historic districts. This ad hoc process of addressing historic preservation issues
itself only creates another ad hoc process of policing historic preservation violations. And this
legal regime will only be effective so long as the FM-BZA and State Department continue to
apply it. 69 In light of the rising demand and adaptive reuse recommendations outlined by the
NCPC, it may well be that the State Department and FM-BZA will be increasingly likely to tread
more heavily on historic preservation.
Without strong precedents of denial on historic preservation grounds, the limits of what
an chancery can do remain undefined. And the two recent precedents of conditional approval and
enforced mediation have little relevance to demolition and replacement proposals. With proposed
acquisitions, there was always much more room for negotiation and arm-twisting and crafting
binding conditions in advance. With a demolition and replacement proposal, however, it is often
a question of yes or no, although these proposals do offer room for negotiation when partial
demolition could potentially meet the future use requirements. 70 It is unclear what approach the
FM-BZA and the State Department will take if a demolition and replacement project is proposed.

69

While the State Department may have assured the FM-BZA in the Benin and Latvia hearings that it approves of
this mediation process, pursuant to its authority under 22 U.S.C. 406(g), it has not formalized this policy in a setting
other than an FM-BZA hearing. This is then a policy designed to give the State Department flexibility should it
choose to develop a different policy in the future.
70
See, e.g., Citizens Committee to Save Historic Rhodes Tavern v. DC DHCD, 432 A.2d 710 (D.C. 1981); Calvary
Baptist Church, HPA Nos. 00-601, 01-044 (Mayor’s Agent, October 4, 2002).
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Finally, the legal basis and implications of the FM-BZA’s imposition of conditions and
enforced mediation process remain murky. If in fact Benin and Latvia are now required to apply
to the HPRB for alteration permits, it seems that this would violate the spirit if not the letter of
section 206 of the FMA as interpreted in Turkish Chancery III as well as in the FM-BZA’s
regulations. 71 If Benin and Latvia’s applications are denied by the HPRB, presumably they
would appeal those decisions to the FM-BZA. Alternatively, the State Department could
intervene by enforcing the HPRB’s decision diplomatically; but if a foreign mission persists in
contesting the decision, a court could find that the HPRB lacked the legal authority to issue the
decision and remand to the FM-BZA. This legal muddle thus raises the broader legal and policy
questions incorrectly and unsatisfactorily answered by Turkish Chancery III: If the FM-BZA
believes delegating to the HPRB is a workable and desirable process for Benin and Latvia, as a
retrospective matter, why should it not be equally workable and desirable for all historic
chanceries, and for all chancery proposals involving alteration, expansion or demolition, as a
prospective matter? Why, in brief, should the FM-BZA have original jurisdiction over such
matters at all? 72

V. Judicial Misinterpretations and Unwarranted Simplifications of the FMA

Ironically enough, it was a legal challenge by the Republic of Benin to a Board of Zoning
Adjustment (BZA) denial order that first established the FM-BZA’s original jurisdiction over
71

See 22 U.S.C. § 4306(j) (Provisions of law (other than this chapter) applicable with respect to the location,
replacement, or expansion of real property in the District of Columbia shall apply with respect to chanceries only to
the extent they are consistent with this section.”)
72
Cf. MAHP decision issued Feb. 5, 2004 (Cape Verde), discussed in note 62, supra. Cape Verde was an easy case
because the HPRB had already approved the subdivision and the purpose of the subdivision was to raise funds for
the refurbishment of the landmark. An interesting question is whether the FM-BZA could have crafted such a
compromise where criteria other than historic preservation would have been included. Presumably the State
Department encouraged Cape Verde to take its case to the HPRB and MAHP precisely to avoid an FM-BZA review
of an actual historic landmark that would exclude the MAHP altogether and thus raise the hackles of the
preservationist community.
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chancery expansions and paved the way for Turkish Chancery III. In Embassy of People’s
Republic of Benin v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 73 decided in 1987, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that all chancery alterations fall under the provisions
of section 206 of the FMA. 74 This holding is unimpeachable in general terms, but the court’s
further determination of what section 206 requires was warranted neither by the facts of the case
nor the FMA’s language.
Benin had sought a variance from the BZA to build a radio broadcast tower on the roof of
its chancery after being informed by the DC Zoning Administrator that the tower would violate
the zoning height restriction. The BZA denied Benin’s application on the basis of DC zoning
law. The court concluded that the argument that
Benin is entitled to seek a special exception to construct the radio tower under local
zoning procedures while reserving its right -- in the event its request was denied under
local law -- to pursue its request under the FMA, would be contrary to the clearlyexpressed intent of Congress to insure a particular form of federal participation in such
decisions in the District of Columbia. Allowing Benin to proceed under local law would
provide no assurance to the federal government that its interest in foreign affairs will be
taken into account, and is, therefore, an interpretation plainly at odds with the expressed
goals of Congress. 75
The modest argument that the court was rejecting here was submitted by no less than the
United States in an amicus brief. The US argued that, pursuant to the FMA, the BZA has the
authority to review Benin’s application as an original matter under DC zoning law; and that the
FM-BZA has the authority to review the appeal from the BZA under the additional criteria of
section 206. 76 The FMA grants the FM-BZA jurisdiction “concerning the location of a chancery
under subsection (b)(2), or concerning an appeal of an administrative decision with respect to a
73

534 A.2d 310 (D.C. 1987).
“[T]he FMA provides the exclusive procedure available for consideration of Benin’s application, and ... the BZA
... was without jurisdiction to review the application solely under District of Columbia law.” Id. at 319.
75
Id. at 321-22 (emphases added).
76
This is no longer the US’s legal position; after Turkish Chancery III, why should it be? But it may well be the
State Department’s practice when it comes to potentially thorny historic landmarks. Cf. FM-BZA decision, note 72
supra (Cape Verde).
74
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chancery based in whole or in part upon any zoning regulation or map.” 77 The plainest reading of
this provision is that the FM-BZA may review chancery application either and only concerning
“location” or an “appeal of an administrative decision.” The FM-BZA’s only original
jurisdiction over chancery applications must be concerning “location”; the regular DC agencies
have original jurisdiction over all other permit matters (including alteration and expansion of
current chanceries); and the FM-BZA reviews appeals of DC agencies’ decisions applying the
full section 206 criteria.
The Embassy of Benin court’s opinion strains logic in rejecting this plain reading of
section 206. How does Benin having to appeal from the BZA to the FM-BZA rather than
enjoying direct access to the FM-BZA in any way jeopardize “federal participation” in chancery
issues or prevent the federal government’s interest in foreign affairs from being “taken into
account”? The court reached this determination because it was most concerned with what it
discerned to be the FMA’s primary purpose: “Congress ... perceived that the protection of United
States interests abroad required the expeditious resolution of chancery issues and consequently
sought to eliminate the time-consuming and overlapping proceedings which resulted under the
then-existing practices.” 78 A related factor driving the court’s decision was the fact that Benin
was seeking permission to build a radio tower. In the Cold War context of 1987, nothing could
be more in keeping with the FMA’s privileging of national security and the reciprocity principle
than the ability of US missions abroad to have unimpeded communication and broadcast rights. 79

77

22 U.S.C. §§ 4306(c)(3), 4306(d). Section 4306(c)(1) is the actual grant of jurisdiction: “If a foreign mission
wishes to locate a chancery in an area described in subsection (b)(2) of this section, or wishes to appeal an
administrative decision relating to a chancery based in whole or in part upon any zoning map or regulation, it shall
file an application with the [FM-BZA].”
78
534 A.2d at 315.
79
See id. at 319 (“The conferees reported that by directing the Secretary of State to require ‘substantial compliance’
with local laws, § 206 (g) not only imposed a requirement ‘stricter than current practice under which [building and
related] codes are not enforced with respect to foreign missions because of diplomatic immunity,’ but it also
permit[ted] the Secretary of State to accommodate special building requirements, generally involving security,
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In many respects, this was an easy case, and the court’s instincts were correct. Benin was
owed the consideration of the federal interest at some point in its application, and it would be
contrary to the intent of Congress to have a DC agency decide whether Benin could ultimately
have a communications facility “solely” on the basis of DC law. Benin’s radio tower, in short,
was clearly a matter for zoning adjustment, as there was no question it would violate the
ordinance, and clearly a matter for federal participation, as this was a serious diplomatic matter.
Because Benin had already received an advisory opinion from the Zoning Administrator, having
to go to the BZA and then the FM-BZA would indeed have been redundant. The court could
simply have ruled that, for chancery applications such as Benin’s requiring zoning adjustment,
the BZA should make a speedy determination and certify the case to the FM-BZA, thereby
cutting out the overlap and ensuring timely federal participation. But because the court was most
concerned about DC agencies in general having the last word rather than the first word on
serious diplomatic issues, the court took it upon itself to decide the much broader jurisdictional
point as to which body should have the only word on all chancery applications.
Although Benin’s chancery was in a historic district, the Benin case had nothing to do
with historic preservation regulations. Unlike a straightforward zoning question, the application
of historic preservation law to a demolition or expansion proposal is more a matter of expert
judgment and the weighing of multiple considerations according to legal standards. If the
Embassy of Benin court viewed it as imperative to cut out the redundancy to ensure federal
participation in matters of zoning adjustment, nothing in the opinion required or made much
policy sense that the same should apply in matters of historic preservation. Yet in Turkish
Chancery III, the federal Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, perhaps taking its cue from the

communications, and related needs, which are often required to be adjusted in a similar manner for U.S. missions
abroad.’ [citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 693-97 at 42] (emphasis added).”)
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broadly interventionist stance of the DC Court of Appeals, held that the FM-BZA has original
jurisdiction over all chancery replacement and expansion applications involving DC historic
preservation law. 80 The court further held that “substantial compliance” with the DC Act entails
nothing more than obtaining an opinion from the HPRB that could be summarily ignored. 81
Like Embassy of Benin, the radically simple, broad and unwarranted holding of Turkish
Chancery III arose from a messy accident of circumstances and jurisdictional confusion. Turkey
first sought permission to demolish and replace its chancery in 1986, before Embassy of Benin
was decided. Quite naively, Turkey did not at first avail itself of the FM-BZA but instead filed
its application with the DC Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA). Turkey
was then referred by the DCRA to the HPRB and was denied three successive times by the
HPRB. 82 After the final denial, in 1988, Turkey requested a review by the MAHP pursuant to the
DC Act, but then withdrew this request and filed its application as an original matter with the
FM-BZA, probably on the strength of the then recently-decided Embassy of Benin. The FMBZA, not knowing quite what to do, referred the proposal to the MAHP for a recommendation,
whose jurisdiction Turkey opposed. Faced with the argument of opposition counsel 83 that the
FM-BZA lacked original jurisdiction, the MAHP threaded the needle and “assume[d] for the
purpose of conducting [the] hearing that the FMA does not preclude a Mayor’s Agent hearing
and [decided to] proceed accordingly.” 84 The MAHP found that the demolition of the
contributing historic building to be inconsistent with the DC Act, and that Turkey did not meet

80

49 F.3d 750, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
Id. at 759.
82
See MAHP decision issued September 6, 1988 (“The Review Board [HPRB] reviewed the application on three
separate occasions: December 17, 1986, September 16, 1987 and October 21, 1987. The Review Board
recommended the demolition permit be denied in the December 17, 1986 meeting, and reaffirmed that position in
the subsequent meetings.”).
83
Richard Nettler, whose arguments I am renewing and expanding in this paper, and who provided valuable
guidance.
84
See MAHP decision issued September 6, 1988.
81
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its burden of demonstrating the special merit of its project. 85 With the MAHP’s opinion in hand,
the FM-BZA then rejected the application on narrower historic preservation grounds. The FMBZA did not disapprove the demolition but found the “excessive size” of the proposed
replacement building to be incompatible with the other structures in the historic district. 86 Thus,
while the FM-BZA decision established that “one criterion [of the six section 206 criteria],
standing alone, may be so sufficiently preponderant as to be dispositive of the case” 87 and that
historic preservation could be that criterion, the decision also established that the FM-BZA could
interpret de novo – and significantly lower – what compliance with the DC Act entails.
At the end of its 1988 opinion, the FM-BZA invited Turkey to correct the size defect and
reapply. 88 For a time, Turkey gave up the ghost and in 1989 instead sought to move its chancery
altogether to a new building at 1714 Massachusetts Avenue. Although this site was also in a
historic district, the FM-BZA approved Turkey’s proposed relocation because it involved no
plans for alteration or expansion. 89 But Turkey soon resumed its original plan to demolish and
replace its existing chancery. With a new and architecturally innovative design that significantly
reduced the size of the above-ground structure, 90 and with the renewed support of the State
Department, 91 Turkey resubmitted its application to the FM-BZA in 1990. The FM-BZA sought
the opinion of the HPRB, which again recommended against the demolition but separately found
that the new structure would be compatible with the historic district. 92 The FM-BZA also
solicited the opinion of the MAHP, who delayed responding (perhaps so as not to contradict the

85

Id.
FM-BZA decision issued September 7, 1988.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
FM-BZA decision issued April 26, 1989.
90
See Turkish Embassy Brochure, available at <http://www.turkishembassy.org/embassy/index.htm>.
91
See 2001 Annual Report of the Department of State Office of Foreign Missions, 11-12 (touting the State
Department’s crucial support in getting the chancery built), available at <http://www.state.gov/ofm/resource/pubs/>.
92
See FM-BZA decision issued January 16, 1991.
86
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earlier MAHP decision that demolition was inconsistent with the DC Act). Six days before the
MAHP’s opinion was due, the FM-BZA approved Turkey’s application on January 16, 1991. 93
The ensuing legal proceedings in court were also a jurisdictional muddle. Citizens groups
as well as the National Trust for Historic Preservation (NTHP) filed suit in federal district court
rather than the DC Court of Appeals, because the Secretary of State was named as a defendant
and the case also involved novel questions about the application of federal historic preservation
law. 94 In the court’s first summary judgment (hereinafter Turkish Chancery I), Judge Greene
found that the FMA grants the FM-BZA original and exclusive jurisdiction not only over
chancery locations but all expansion and demolition permits. 95 Judge Greene did not, however,
resolve the question as to whether the FM-BZA substantially complied with the DC Act until the
court’s second summary judgment (hereinafter Turkish Chancery II), when he took into account
the newly-presented fact that the FM-BZA had solicited the opinion of the MAHP as well as the
HPRB. Judge Greene found that consultation with the HPRB and MAHP was all the compliance
required under FMA section 206. 96 After the NTHP and the citizens groups appealed on this and
other issues, Turkey, now an intervenor in the case, overcame its final obstacle when the DC
Circuit affirmed that the FM-BZA’s jurisdiction and decision were in accordance with the FMA.
On the question of the FM-BZA’s original jurisdiction over demolition and expansion as
well as location, the Turkish Chancery III decision offered an argument from statutory language:
The most plausible reading of the statute ... is that it gives the [FM-BZA] exclusive
jurisdiction over all proposals involving ‘the location, replacement, or expansion of
chanceries in the District of Columbia.’ 22 U.S.C. § 4306(a). After all, the statute
contemplates that a foreign mission will file an application with the [FM-BZA] ‘with
93

Id.
This large issue is beyond the scope of this paper. But see textual discussion infra for why filing in federal court
may have been a mistake that, in retrospect, could have been avoided, perhaps with a different result. The citizens
groups were shooting for the moon on the federal historic preservation law question.
95
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respect to such location, replacement, or expansion,’ 22 U.S.C. § 4306(b)(2), (c)(3);
provides that the decision of the [FM-BZA] ‘shall not be subject to the administrative
proceedings of any other agency or official,’ 22 U.S.C. § 4306(c)(3); and allows for the
operation of other laws ‘only to the extent they are consistent with [22 U.S.C. § 4306].’
22 U.S.C. § 4306(j). 97
All of the language cited above by Judge Ginsburg is relevant and accurate, but nothing
in it specifically or in the aggregate requires the FM-BZA to have original jurisdiction over
“replacement or expansion” as well as “location.” The fact that the first paragraph of section
206(a) states that “[t]he location, replacement, or expansion of chanceries [in DC] shall be
subject to this section” does not mean that section 206 requires all three to be dealt with in the
same way. 98 The fact that the statute contemplates the “filing of an application [with the FMBZA] with respect to such location, replacement, or expansion,” and that “[a] final determination
concerning the location, replacement, or expansion of a chancery shall be made not later than 6
months after the filing of an application” does not mean that the “applications” must be original
applications and not applications considered by the FM-BZA on appeal. 99 The fact that the
statute provides that the determination by the FM-BZA “shall not be subject to the administrative
proceedings of any other agency or official” does not preclude an administrative agency from
making an original determination concerning a replacement or expansion permit. 100
In fact, on the language cited by the court, the statute could be read in two ways that run
counter to Judge Ginsburg’s interpretation. When replacement or expansions are contemplated as
pendent questions of location – that is, when a foreign mission is either newly locating or
relocating and has plans to expand or replace the structure – then and only then does the FMBZA have original jurisdiction over replacement and expansion proposals. Or, alternatively and
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Turkish Chancery III, 49 F.3d 750, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
22 U.S.C. § 4306(a).
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Id. at § 4306(b)(2)
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more strictly, the FM-BZA only has original jurisdiction over location and relocation proposals,
and only appellate jurisdiction over replacement and expansion (and of course alteration)
applications. The only outstanding question with the latter possibility is whether the six-month
time limit would apply to both the DC agency’s and FM-BZA’s decision (thereby capping the
total application process at six months, and compelling the DC agency to act quickly) or just to
the FM-BZA’s appellate decision. The former would make more sense from a policy standpoint.
If the language cited by Judge Ginsburg were all the relevant language bearing on the
jurisdictional question, the court’s reading might indeed be plausible. But the court also had to
come to terms with the contradictory language of section 206(c)(1), which describes the FMBZA’s jurisdiction as concerning “locat[ion]... or [an] appeal [from] an administrative agency”
and nothing else. 101 To resolve this contradiction, Judge Ginsburg had to conflate the specific
with the general in a statutory surgery that does not quite work (although he presents it as
necessary):
Paragraph (c)(1) ... cannot describe the universe of cases that may come before
the [FM-BZA]. For paragraph (c)(3) of § 206 speaks of [FM-BZA] determinations
"concerning the location, replacement, or expansion of a chancery" and provides that
such decisions "shall not be subject to the administrative proceedings of any other agency
or official except as provided in this chapter." 22 U.S.C. § 4306(c)(3). The only way to
give effective operation to both of these provisions is to conclude that the term "location"
in paragraph (c)(1) includes the ‘replacement" and ‘expansion’ determinations referred to
in paragraph (c)(3), and that zoning issues that do not involve ‘location, replacement, or
expansion,’ i.e., those not covered by paragraph (c)(3), are to be raised first before the
appropriate D.C. authority and then brought to the [FM-BZA] on appeal pursuant to
paragraph (c)(1).
If paragraph (c)(1) allowed the [FM-BZA] to review only zoning decisions of
some other agency (at least when the matter is not one of ‘location’), then the reference in
paragraph (c)(3) to replacement and expansion determinations not subject to the
proceedings of any other agency would be meaningless. Rather, we must conclude that
paragraph (c)(3) gives the [FM-BZA] exclusive original jurisdiction over zoning
determinations governing the ‘location, replacement, or expansion’ of a chancery; as to
all other zoning issues relating to a chancery, [FM-BZA] has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction under subsection (c)(1). Replacement and perhaps expansion are clearly at
101

Id. at § 4306(c)(1).

Michael Hurwitz
Historic Preservation Seminar

30

issue in this case, and Turkey’s proposal was therefore properly before the [FM-BZA] in
the first instance.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals would agree [citing Embassy of
Benin].... 102
As a matter of interpreting statutory language, this discussion is riddled with specious
assertions of necessity (conveniently emphasized above). First, Judge Ginsburg bears the burden
of plausibility because he is contradicting the plainest reading of the statute. A standard canon of
statutory interpretation is “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” 103 – the expression of one thing
rules out the thing not mentioned. Read according to this canon, the FMA specifying either
location or appeal does exclude everything else that is not specified from the universe of the FMBZA’s jurisdiction. Second, Judge Ginsburg simply ignores his own cited language of “except as
provided in this chapter” when he quotes that the FM-BZA determinations “shall not be subject
to the administrative proceedings of any other agency or official....” A fairer opinion would have
examined how the chapter does in fact provide otherwise, and an obvious answer would be that it
treats decisions about location differently than decisions about replacement or expansion. But
even this is an unnecessary argument to make, because the section referred to (but not cited) by
Judge Ginsburg as the capstone of his interpretation in fact only refers to “a final determination
concerning the location, replacement, or expansion of a chancery....” 104 In other words, this
language only mandates that the FM-BZA cannot be subsequently reviewed by another agency
or official; it has nothing to do with a prior determination by an agency or official. Far from
requiring that there be one and only one determination, the word “final” implies an original
determination appealed to the FM-BZA.
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Turkish Chancery III, 49 F.3d at 757-58 (emphases added).
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 621, 664 (1990).
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Third, it is hardly necessary, let alone logical, to read “location” as including
“replacement” and “expansion” and far from “meaningless” to read it otherwise. “Location” as
meaning, in shorthand and implicitly, “location, replacement, or expansion” is a questionable
interpretive stretch, especially when two interpretations are available that take the words as they
are: (1) that the FM-BZA can only take up replacement and expansion as an original matter when
pendent with a location determination; or (2) that the FM-BZA can never take up replacement
and expansion as an original matter. Judge Ginsburg, in other words, chose the least plausible
interpretation of several possibilities. Moreover, he never acknowledges the fact that if Congress
had intended the jurisdictional scheme favored by the court, it could have simply stated that
“location” means “location, replacement, or expansion” for the purposes of this section. 105
Fourth, Judge Ginsburg wholly ignores the statute’s repetition in section 206(d) of
“location ... or appeal from an administrative decision” when laying out the FM-BZA’s criteria
for making its determinations. 106 This restatement of the 206(c)(1) language lends strong support
to the interpretation that these are exhaustive and exclusive terms: to think otherwise is to
presume that Congress made the same mistake twice. Of course, the interpretation favored by
this paper still has to account for section 206(d)(2), which speaks of the criterion of historic
preservation as applied to “new construction and to demolition of or alteration to historic
landmarks.” How can the FM-BZA only have original jurisdiction over “location” when here
construction, demolition, and alteration are explicitly contemplated? But this is not difficult to
resolve, because the same jurisdictional framework applies. Again, two possibilities present
105

Section 205 suggest that the radical reading may be the more plausible, that location only means location: “For
purposes of this section, ‘acquisition’ includes any acquisition or alteration of, or addition to, any real property.” 22
U.S.C. § 4305. This refers to all the instances when a foreign mission must inform the OFM in advance of a
chancery acquisition. The point is limited, because it only applies “for purpose of this section,” but it shows that
Congress knew how to define “location” as “location, replacement or expansion” if it wanted to, but did not do so in
section 206. Also, Congress could have simply put in “acquisition” instead of location if it wanted to provide the
most comprehensive original jurisdiction to the FM-BZA.
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themselves. When a chancery locates at a new location, and if its proposed use involves
“expansion or replacement,” then the FM-BZA as an original matter may look to “new
construction and to demolition of or alteration to historic landmarks ... in order to ensure
compatibility with historic landmarks and districts.” 107 When a chancery is appealing a decision
of the HPRB and MAHP which did not involve a change in or new “location,” the section
206(d)(2) criterion becomes the standard of appellate review. This latter would also be the case
under the stricter interpretation that the FM-BZA has original jurisdiction only over “location”
and only “expansion or replacement” as an appellate matter. A final difficulty is that the criterion
section refers to “alteration” as well, whereas the preceding provisions speak of “replacement or
expansion.” But this too is not difficult to resolve. As an appellate matter, the FM-BZA will only
apply this historic preservation criterion if a DC agency (namely the HPRB) denies an alteration
permit. This section, then, does not undermine the FM-BZA’s original jurisdiction only over
location (and perhaps pendent jurisdiction over replacement or expansion). In short, everything
ins section 206 can be logically and consistently fit into the “location ... or appeal” framework in
ways that do no violence to the plain language.
As its final jurisdictional point, the Turkish Chancery III court makes much of the fact
that the FMA, in section 207, expressly allows for the preemption of DC law. But this argument
suffers from the same interpretive flaw as the court’s misreading of section 206:
[T]he plaintiffs argue that the FMA does not preempt applicable local law, and that
Turkey is still required to comply with the procedures of District of Columbia zoning
law. Both the FMA and local law, however, strongly suggest the contrary. Section 207 of
the FMA, 22 U.S.C. § 4307, provides: ‘Nothing in section 4302, 4303, 4304, or 4305 of
this title may be construed to preempt any State or municipal law of governmental
authority regarding zoning, land use, health, safety, or welfare....’ Glaringly absent from
this provision is any reference to § 206, 22 U.S.C. § 4306, which, of course, implies that
§ 206 ‘may be construed to preempt’ D.C. zoning and kindred laws. 108
107
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Just as the court closed its eyes to the fact that not allowing the FM-BZA’s final decisions
to be subject to DC review did not rule out the FM-BZA having appellate DC decisions not
concerning “location,” here the court is willfully unmindful that the FMA only preempts what
the FMA does not allow of DC law. Because section 206 already permits DC original
jurisdiction over every other matter but “location,” and in fact mandates “substantial
compliance” with DC law on appeal to the FM-BZA, the DC Act is not preempted in the same
way that DC zoning law concerning new locations would be preempted per Embassy of Benin.
The court is also on uncertain ground in implying that its interpretation must be correct because
DC regulations interpret the FM-BZA’s authority in the same way. 109 Surely the court is not
suggesting that DC itself would have any say one way or another in how the FM-BZA is to be
applied, since (in its view) the FMA preempts DC law from having any say. But the court,
against it better judgment, may in fact be right on this count. As the Conference Report on the
FMA stated: “Section 206(j) provides that other provisions of law shall apply to chanceries in
[DC] only to the extent they are consistent with this section. This is in lieu of the House
provision which made the [FMA] the exclusive law governing foreign missions in DC.” 110 Not
only is the DC Act consistent with section 206, but, because Congress ultimately decided to
create the FM-BZA as a majority-DC hybrid agency whose regulations are part of DC law, DC
may perhaps retain significant interpretive authority over what substantial compliance requires.
Like the Embassy of Benin court, The Turkish Chancery III court also argued for the FMBZA’s broad original jurisdiction from a one-sided view of the legislative history and objectives
109

“Likewise, § 206 provides that the Secretary shall require missions to comply substantially with D.C. ‘building
and related codes,’ 22 U.S.C. § 4306(g); and D.C. law provides a comprehensive scheme for the HPRB to review
applications submitted to the [FM-BZA], see, e.g., 11 D.C.M.R. § 1002.7. Both of these requirements would be
wholly redundant if proposals such as Turkey’s were subject to the usual processes for making D.C. zoning
determinations. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's conclusion that Turkey's application was properly
submitted to the [FM-BZA], rather than to whatever local body would have been appropriate but for the FMA.” Id.
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of the FMA. 111 Yet the legislative history makes clear that Congress was primarily concerned
with chancery location issues – with DC erecting barriers to entry through zoning and with
preventing chanceries full use of their facilities – and not with overly-strict policing of historic
preservation violations. 112 The emphasis on zoning is consistent throughout the evolution of
jurisdiction from the NCPC to the Foreign Missions Commission to the FM-BZA. 113 Allowing
the FM-BZA rather than the NCPC or Foreign Mission Commission to determine chancery
issues, and allowing a significant place for DC law in these determination, reinforce the
interpretation that the FM-BZA properly has only appellate jurisdiction over matters not
concerned with zoning. In sum, nothing in the legislative history precludes the split jurisdiction
model, and nothing in it requires the sole original jurisdiction advanced in Turkish Chancery III.
Turkey Chancery III did perhaps an even greater disservice to DC historic preservation
law by establishing no floor for what substantial compliance means under section 206(d)(2). If
the court performed a motley surgery on the jurisdictional question, here it performed a blunt
amputation. The court defined substantial compliance in strictly procedural terms:
Although the statute speaks in the passive voice and thus fails to state clearly who
or what must substantially comply with the applicable regulations, we believe it is the
project, not the [FM-BZA]. In practice, however, this determination does not advance the
issue very far, because ‘compliance’ with these laws, in this case at least, is not as much a
111

See Turkish Chancery III, 49 F.3d at 759-60.
Nowhere throughout any of the relevant reports of the House or Senate did I find any reference to overly-strict
enforcement of historic preservation law.
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The Report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs stated that, in the context of national security issues, the
legislative “places the authority to determine the location of foreign missions in the capital with the [NCPC], which
under present law already has statutory authority to plan for such locations.” H. Rep. No. 97-102 at 34-35 (1981).
The Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated: “Section 206 provides that issues concerning the
location of foreign missions in the District of Columbia will be settled by a newly created District of Columbia
Foreign Missions Commission.” Further: “The controversy with respect to this section concerns the location in the
Nation’s Capital of foreign mission chanceries.... Notwithstanding the significant Federal interest, local officials
have since 1978 initiated actions which have severely curtailed the ability of the foreign affairs agencies to comply
with international obligations in our Nation’s capital, through restrict laws and regulations openly discriminating
against chancery uses.... What section 206 seeks is to establish procedures and regulatory guidelines which provide a
proper balance of Federal and local interests with respect to the location of foreign missions in [DC].” S. Rep. No.
97-283 at 17-18 (1981). The Report of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs reiterated the FMA’s
emphasis on location and non-discrimination against chanceries. See S. Rep. No. 97-329, at 13 (1982).
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matter of meeting any specific standard as it is of submitting the proposal to the
appropriate regulatory body or bodies for review and comment. Thus, the plaintiffs argue
that the proposal had to be reviewed – at some point – by the MAHP... [whereas] the
defendants argue that referral to the HPRB fully satisfied the requirements of the statute.
...
We do not reach the question whether anyone was required to submit the proposal
to the MAHP, because the [FM-BZA] in fact referred Turkey's plan to the MAHP. The
plaintiffs’ argument therefore reduces to an assertion that the [FM-BZA] was required to
wait for a determination by the MAHP before approving Turkey’s proposal.
...
The FMA requires the [FM-BZA] to make a final determination on a chancery
proposal within six months of receiving an application. 22 U.S.C. § 4306(c)(3). The [FMBZA] received Turkey's application on September 18, 1990 and referred it to the MAHP
promptly on September 26. On March 15, 1991, only a few days before the six months
had run, the [FM-BZA] made its decision without having heard back from the MAHP.
Nor is there any indication in the record that the MAHP was about to respond. For the
[FM-BZA] to have waited upon the MAHP would have been inconsistent with its
statutory timetable and would have imported into the process just the sort of
indeterminate delay that the FMA was meant to keep out of the process for approving
chancery improvements. 114
Judge Ginsburg accomplished a none-too-subtle sleight of hand here. He “reduces” the
plaintiffs’ argument that the FM-BZA failed to ensure substantial compliance with DC historic
preservation law to the barest procedural question of whether the FM-BZA “was required to
wait” for the MAHP’s opinion. This is hardly a legitimate reduction, because even as the court
acknowledges, it is the “project, not the Board” that must substantially comply. But even on the
terms chosen by the court, it was absurd to find that requiring the FM-BZA to “wait[] upon the
MAHP ... would have imported into the process the indeterminate delay that the FMA was meant
to keep out of the process.” 115 Six days is exactly the opposite of “indeterminate”; it is a fixed
and brief period, and everyone agreed six months was the proper timetable. The court claimed to
not “reach” the question of whether the MAHP was required to be consulted, but then illogically
ruled that, once consulted, the MAHP need not be given its full statutory leeway. Never
mentioned in the opinion, of course, is the real reason for the FM-BZA’s rush – not the
114
115
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impending expiration of the statutory timetable, but the impending Persian Gulf War. That is
what in fact “imported” a new element into the process and why the FM-BZA would not wait six
more days. The court simply substituted its own view of what the FMA was “meant” to do in
holding, in effect, that the FMA privileges speed over compliance with DC law to an extent
greater than the FMA actually requires. Not only is actual compliance with the statutory six
months now insufficient to comply with the FMA, but “substantial compliance” with DC law is
not even necessary.
These are small quibbles, however, compared to the larger problem with the court’s
holding that “substantial compliance” is “not a matter of meeting any specific standard” but
rather is a matter only of observing procedural courtesies. The plaintiffs’ real concern was not
which “appropriate regulatory body or bodies” should have been “consulted” but rather what
standard of deference or review “substantial compliance” requires of the FM-BZA. In its
approval of the Turkish chancery’s demolition and replacement, the FM-BZA simply ignored the
HPRB’s disapproval without comment and never identified how the project substantially
complies with the DC Act. Behind the smokescreen of the court’s procedural discussion of the
MAHP, the upshot of Turkish Chancery III is that so long as the FM-BZA complies with its own
procedural regulations, it owes no deference to the HPRB and need not apply the DC Act at all in
its review of chancery projects. Earlier the court characterized the regulations governing the FMBZA’s procedures as a “comprehensive scheme.” It is hardly this; rather, as we have seen, it is a
bare-bones scheme. 116 Instead of establishing a legal standard for what, at a minimum,
substantial compliance with the DC Act would mean – what part would be required, and what
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Id. at 759 (“Likewise, § 206 provides that the Secretary shall require missions to comply substantially with D.C.
‘building and related codes,’ 22 U.S.C. § 4306(g); and D.C. law provides a comprehensive scheme for the HPRB to
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part could be overlooked – Turkish Chancery III set the floor for compliance lower than DC law
itself – to procedural regulations that were simply a first attempt to implement the FMA. Because
the FM-BZA owes no deference to the HPRB as a procedural matter, the DC Act has no
necessary weight under the FM-BZA’s section 206 authority.

VI. Conclusion and Recommendations: Meaning of Substantial Compliance with DC Law
Under the FMA
What is to be done about Turkish Chancery III, now that the opinion is nearly a decade
old? Exactly nothing has been done so far, either by DC or Congress. Yet, it is worth asking,
even by those who would ultimately agree with the DC circuit court’s view, whether, under DC
Home Rule, a federal court should have the final say over the interpretation of the FMA and the
FM-BZA’s compliance with it. It is worth noting, as well, that had the citizens groups only sued
on the questions of the FM-BZA’s jurisdiction and “substantial compliance” with the DC Act,
they would have gone instead to the DC Court of Appeals, and the result might have been
different, though perhaps not so in light of Embassy of Benin. Yet that too was an old case, not
decided on historic preservation, and well before the HPRB and MAHP had established their
legal bona fides as consistent and fair regulatory bodies administering the DC Act.
One telling omission of Turkish Chancery III is that the DC circuit court did not cite to a
crucial 1978 opinion of the DC Court of Appeals, Wheeler v. District of Columbia Board of
Zoning Adjustment, 117 that clearly defined substantial compliance. This must have been a
deliberate omission, because Wheeler was cited to (and mischaracterized) in Turkish Chancery
II. 118 Wheeler concerned whether the BZA complied with a provision of DC law that requires
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395 A.2d 85 (D.C. App. 1978).
“‘Substantial compliance’ is not strict compliance [citing Wheeler]. The FM-BZA need only comply with the
spirit of law 2-144, which here means soliciting the views of the Mayor's Agent.” Turkish Chancery II, 834 F. Supp.
443, 455 (D.D.C. 1993).
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that the BZA to give “great weight” to the opinion of an Advisory Neighborhood Commission
(ANC) in deliberating about a special exception project. The law requires that “[t]he issues and
concerns raised in the recommendations of the ANC shall be given great weight during the
deliberations by the governmental agency and those issues shall be discussed in the written
rationale for the governmental decision taken.” 119 A legal decision subsequent to the underlying
BZA decision, Kopff v. D.C. Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 120 interpreted the “great
weight” provision as requiring “explicit reference to each ANC issue and concern as such, as
well as specific findings and conclusions with respect to each.” 121 Because the BZA’s decision
preceded the Kopff guidance, the Wheeler court held that only substantial compliance with the
“great weight” provision was required 122 The court explained what this standard entails:
“Substantial compliance” is “such compliance with [the] essential requirements of the . . .
provision as may be sufficient for the accomplishment of the purposes thereof.” [citation
ommitted]. It “means actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every
reasonable objective of the statute.” [citations omitted]. Consequently, a determination of
whether the BZA has substantially complied with D.C. Code 1978 Supp., § 1-171i(d)
requires first an examination of the “purposes” or “reasonable objectives” of the “great
weight” provision, and second a decision of whether the BZA's findings sufficiently
satisfy these purposes and objectives. 123
In Wheeler, the ANC had raised eight issues concerning the project in question which the
BZA was required to address. The court found that of these six issues, one was not a genuine
issue, one was irrelevant, and the BZA had covered the four other issues in its discussion of the
special exception project. 124 Because the purpose of the “great weight” provision was to “forc[e]
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an agency to come to grips with the ANC view – to deal with it in detail,” and the BZA had
sufficiently accomplished this, the court found that the BZA substantially complied. 125
Wheeler is useful in pointing the way forward for “substantial compliance” under the
FMA in two respects. It firmly establishes not only what substantial compliance entails – a high
standard of compliance – but what it meant at the time the FMA was passed – both Wheeler and
the DC Act were four years old in 1982. Ensuring substantial compliance under FMA section
206(d)(2) thus meant ensuring that the DC Act’s purposes and objective were being sufficiently
met by a given chancery proposal. Wheeler is also useful in suggesting how substantial
compliance can be achieved through procedural means, because it reminds us that the FM-BZA
is still required to give “great weight” to the ANC opinion concerning a chancery project in
performing its section 206 balancing of the six criteria applicable to chancery applications. 126
DC could similarly pass a law or promulgate a regulation that would require the FM-BZA
to give some measure of deference or even “great weight” to the HPRB as well: requiring, at
least, that the FM-BZA respond directly to each point of the HPRB’s opinion of how the DC Act
applies to the chancery project in question. This new requirement would of course only be
operative when, in cases such as that of Turkey, the FM-BZA rejects the HPRB’s disapproval. It
would still ultimately be up to the FM-BZA to determine that the HPRB’s historic preservation
concerns may not be enough to deny a permit, because the FM-BZA must still weigh historic
preservation against five other considerations under FMA section 206, and there may well be
case where the foreign policy interest of the United States do trump historic preservation. But
this change in the law would at least require historic preservation to be taken into account

125

Id.

Michael Hurwitz
Historic Preservation Seminar

40

explicitly and in light of the applicable standards of the DC Act. Historic preservation, in short,
would at least be allowed a fair chance.
While the time is ripe for a regulatory reform of the FM-BZA’s application of
“substantial compliance,” DC probably could not, on its own, correct the improper jurisdictional
scheme affirmed in Embassy of Benin and Turkish Chancery III. The FM-BZA’s sole original
jurisdiction over chancery issues is too well-settled (albeit wrongly settled); there has been too
much reliance on the scheme currently in place for any court, or even DC, to change what is
perceived to be a statutory requirement. Congress alone can clarify the jurisdictional issue, which
is unlikely to happen. But because “substantial compliance” with DC law would merely be a
matter of applying existing DC law, and because the term already has a definite legal meaning in
Wheeler, a new DC regulation that simply raised the standard back to what it should be would
probably survive a legal challenge in a DC court. Such a challenge would have to arise from a
foreign mission whose application were denied by the HPRB and also (perhaps reluctantly so) by
the FM-BZA. Ironically enough, even in light of Turkish Chancery III, a new historic
preservation “great weight” law or regulation would probably be on solid legal ground. To be
sure, it was probably mere convenience, if not cynicism, that led the Turkish Chancery III court
to cite to DC’s modest regulations as evidence that that court’s impoverished interpretation of the
FMA was both proper and in keeping with DC law. Yet Turkey Chancery III could nonetheless
be advanced as standing for the proposition that DC has the right to interpret FMA section
206(d)(2) as it sees fit, so long as that interpretation is consistent with the purposes of the FMA.
This more modest regulatory reform of “substantial compliance” would also probably
have much the same effect as would a more radical and far less feasible jurisdictional reform.
The HPRB need not have original jurisdiction over demolition and replacement so long as the
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FM-BZA is directly responsive and somewhat deferential to the HPRB’s review of a chancery
project, which would be applying the DC Act. Substantial compliance, accurately applied, would
more than compensate for the HPRB’s lack of original jurisdiction. Moreover, this reform could
build on the FM-BZA’s recent Benin and Latvia precedents where the State Department and FMBZA seem already inclined to delegate to the HPRB for matters of historic preservation
enforcement traditionally within the HPRB’s purview. The recent Cape Verde decision may in
fact demonstrate a newfound willingness on the part of the State Department and the FM-BZA to
defer to DC preservation authorities such as the MAHP at least for non-controversial cases.127
On the one hand, the FM-BZA and the State Department’s newfound respect for historic
preservation marks one positive legacy of the Turkish Chancery case. While historic preservation
may certainly still be ignored as a legal matter, practically and politically speaking that is
difficult to do today. Even the radical and unwarranted resolution of the Turkish Chancery case
itself was still subject to the political input of historic preservation: It was perhaps a small victory
but a victory nonetheless that Turkey was forced to reduce the size of its new chancery due to the
HPRB’s multiple disapprovals before the jurisdictional question was decided. Thus, even if no
legal or regulatory reform is achieved, the Turkish Chancery case still stands as a cautionary tale.
No foreign mission, let alone the State Department or FM-BZA, would wish to go through the
same legal hassle again or risk similar political resistance.
On the other hand, because of the radical legal scheme left in place by Turkish Chancery
III, no foreign mission would have to go through quite the same travail. Though the next
demolition and replacement proposal will probably (hopefully) not have the benefit of a war to
help its case, it will still have the benefit of the ill-advised precedent set by Turkish Chancery III
that historic preservation has no legal weight as compared to the foreign policy interests of the
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United States. Today, those foreign policy interests are perhaps more significant and far-reaching
than ever before. When the time comes for a new challenge to an FM-BZA decision by the
historic preservation community – and that time could be near due to the impending growth of
chanceries in DC, and the attractiveness of historic properties – Turkish Chancery III will well be
worth reexamining. Perhaps then DC authorities, a DC court, or even Congress, will act to
achieve a long overdue reform and restore the balanced compromise between preserving
diplomacy and history that the FMA embodied.
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Appendix: FMA Section 206, 22 U.S.C. § 4306
§ 4306. Location of foreign missions in the District of Columbia
(a) Section as governing location, replacement, or expansion. The location, replacement, or expansion of
chanceries in the District of Columbia shall be subject to this section.
(b) Acceptable areas; limitations and conditions.
(1) A chancery shall be permitted to locate as a matter of right in any area which is zoned commercial,
industrial, waterfront, or mixed-use (CR).
(2) A chancery shall also be permitted to locate-(A) in any area which is zoned medium-high or high density residential, and
(B) in any other area, determined on the basis of existing uses, which includes office or institutional
uses, including but not limited to any area zoned mixed-use diplomatic or special purpose,
subject to disapproval by the District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment in accordance with this
section.
(3) In each of the areas described in paragraphs (1) and (2), the limitations and conditions applicable to
chanceries shall not exceed those applicable to other office or institutional uses in that area.
(c) Filing of application with Board of Zoning Adjustment; publication of notice; public participation;
final determination.
(1) If a foreign mission wishes to locate a chancery in an area described in subsection (b)(2), or wishes
to appeal an administrative decision relating to a chancery based in whole or in part upon any zoning map
or regulation, it shall file an application with the Board of Zoning Adjustment which shall publish notice
of that application in the District of Columbia Register.
(2) Regulations issued to carry out this section shall provide appropriate opportunities for participation
by the public in proceedings concerning the location, replacement, or expansion of chanceries.
(3) A final determination concerning the location, replacement, or expansion of a chancery shall be
made not later than six months after the date of the filing of an application with respect to such location,
replacement, or expansion. Such determination shall not be subject to the administrative proceedings of
any other agency or official except as provided in this title.
(d) Criteria for determination. Any determination concerning the location of a chancery under subsection
(b)(2), or concerning an appeal of an administrative decision with respect to a chancery based in whole or
in part upon any zoning regulation or map, shall be based solely on the following criteria:
(1) The international obligation of the United States to facilitate the provision of adequate and secure
facilities for foreign missions in the Nation's Capital.
(2) Historic preservation, as determined by the Board of Zoning Adjustment in carrying out this section;
and in order to ensure compatibility with historic landmarks and districts, substantial compliance with
District of Columbia and Federal regulations governing historic preservation shall be required with
respect to new construction and to demolition of or alteration to historic landmarks.
(3) The adequacy of off-street or other parking and the extent to which the area will be served by public
transportation to reduce parking requirements, subject to such special security requirements as may be
determined by the Secretary, after consultation with Federal agencies authorized to perform protective
services.
(4) The extent to which the area is capable of being adequately protected, as determined by the
Secretary, after consultation with Federal agencies authorized to perform protective services.
(5) The municipal interest, as determined by the Mayor of the District of Columbia.
(6) The Federal interest, as determined by the Secretary.
(e) Consistency of regulations, proceedings, and other actions; review and comment by National Planning
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Commission.
(1) Regulations, proceedings, and other actions of the National Capital Planning Commission, the
Zoning Commission for the District of Columbia, and the Board of Zoning Adjustment affecting the
location, replacement, or expansion of chanceries shall be consistent with this section (including the
criteria set out in subsection (d)) and shall reflect the policy of this title.
(2) Proposed actions of the Zoning Commission concerning implementation of this section shall be
referred to the National Capital Planning Commission for review and comment.
(f) Rule-making nature of proceedings. Regulations issued to carry out this section shall provide for
proceedings of a rule-making and not of an adjudicatory nature.
(g) Compliance with District of Columbia building and related codes. The Secretary shall require foreign
missions to comply substantially with District of Columbia building and related codes in a manner
determined by the Secretary to be not inconsistent with the international obligations of the United States.
(h) Approval of Board of Zoning Adjustment or Zoning Commission not required. Approval by the Board
of Zoning Adjustment or the Zoning Commission or, except as provided in section 205, by any other
agency or official is not required-(1) for the location, replacement, or expansion of a chancery to the extent that authority to proceed, or
rights or interests, with respect to such location, replacement, or expansion were granted to or otherwise
acquired by the foreign mission before the effective date of this section; or
(2) for continuing use of a chancery by a foreign mission to the extent that the chancery was being used
by a foreign mission on the effective date of this section.
(i) Membership on Zoning Commission and Board of Zoning Adjustment.
(1) The President may designate the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Interior, or the
Administrator of General Services (or such alternate as such official may from time to time designate) to
serve as a member of the Zoning Commission in lieu of the Director of the National Park Service
whenever the President determines that the Zoning Commission is performing functions concerning the
implementation of this section.
(2) Whenever the Board of Zoning Adjustment is performing functions regarding an application by a
foreign mission with respect to the location, expansion, or replacement of a chancery-(A) the representative from the Zoning Commission shall be the Director of the National Park Service
or if another person has been designated under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the person so designated;
and
(B) the representative from the National Capital Planning Commission shall be the Executive Director
of that Commission.
(j) Application of other laws. Provisions of law (other than this title) applicable with respect to the
location, replacement, or expansion of real property in the District of Columbia shall apply with respect to
chanceries only to the extent that they are consistent with this section.

